Via Miguel Madeira, encontrei o melhor post que já li acerca do impasse grego. O post clarifica na perfeição, através de um jogo de escolha múltipla, aquilo que tentei defender na série Compreender a Alemanha: no ponto em que as coisas estão, pura e simplesmente já não há boas soluções para a Grécia. A gama de escolhas tem-de vindo a estreitar e, neste momento, todas as opções conduzem a becos sem saída, colapsos económicos ou situações insustentáveis para os contribuintes alemães. Cito apenas uma parte.
[...] It seems to me that left and right are united in the view that the Greek default is being handled appallingly, that the current attempts at a solution are childishly obviously wrong and that everything is the fault of someone, probably the Germans. My own view – that it is not at all clear what the direction of policy is, and that although I don’t agree with the troika plan, it’s recognizable as a good-faith plan made by conscientious international civil servants working under unimaginably difficult political constraints in an economic context that was irreparably broken before they got there – is, as always, unpopular [...] I don’t have a solution myself – the more I end up discussing this with people, the more I am reminded of the London Business School proverb taught on some of the gnarlier case studies, which is “Not All Business Problems Have Solutions”.
E um pequeno comentário de Paul Krugman, que também retrata bem a questão:
It’s not too hard to see what Europe as a whole should be doing: less demands for austerity, much more general reflation [...] It’s much harder, however, to say what the leaders of such peripheral economies should do. Unilateral default won’t solve the competitiveness problem, and at least for now would actually worsen the fiscal squeeze, since they’re all still running primary deficits. (That may change in a year or so). Euro exit would allow a quick devaluation, solving the competitiveness problem — but it would be hugely disruptive and would generate vast ill-will, so it’s hard to see any government taking that step until there really are no alternatives (which may soon be true for Greece, but not the others). So there’s a kind of trap. If you imagine yourself as the Prime Minister of such a country, what can you do? For the most part, I’m afraid, you plead with the troika to make the austerity demands less severe, you do what you can to accelerate improving competitiveness (which isn’t much), and you wait for things either to get gradually better via “internal devaluation” or to get worse and provide the economic and political environment in which euro exit becomes a real possibility.